The Financial Services Tribunal has dismissed an application to reconsider Sanlam Developing Markets Limited’s decision to debar one of its former authorised principals after finding that his own admissions about more than R1.1 million in payments to a former Sanlam employee, which he described as “protection” fees, supported Sanlam’s conclusion that he lacked the honesty and integrity required under the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act.
In its decision of 3 August 2026, the Tribunal also rejected the applicant’s procedural challenge, holding that he had wrongly sought to characterise the statutory debarment process as though it were a disciplinary hearing or trial.
The applicant, Moltken Pitso Maake, was the authorised principal in the Sanlam Adviser Network and the controlling mind of Tebogo Ya Pitso Holdings (TYP), a franchise that conducted business on Sanlam’s behalf under a management outsourced business agreement.
Sanlam Developing Markets decided on 3 December 2025 to debar him and communicated the decision on 8 December 2025.
Investigation into two concerns
The matter arose from two concerns brought to Sanlam’s attention.
The first was Maake’s own disclosure that he had made multiple payments to Khuliso Mulaudzi, a former Sanlam employee and portfolio manager, which he described as “protection” fees.
The second was a whistleblower allegation that advisers affiliated with TYP were using the Easypay payment mechanism to prevent client policies from lapsing and thereby avoid commission clawbacks.
Sanlam appointed Bowmans to investigate both matters.
According to the Tribunal, Maake told Bowmans that the payments were made through TYP to secure Mulaudzi’s assistance in removing his then business partner from the franchise and to obtain ongoing “protection” for its continued operation.
Maake said he believed the payments would protect the franchise from adverse action by Sanlam, including investigation or termination, and acknowledged that no legitimate business services or tangible benefits were provided in return. Banking records that Maake himself supplied reflected 23 payments between August 2023 and February 2025, totalling R1 142 500, including payments of R270 000, R200 000, R275 000, and R100 000.
Bowmans also examined Easypay data, text messages, and U$ave payment receipts. According to the Tribunal, the data showed that 58% of Easypay payments collected on TYP policies were less than 30% of the required premium, resulting in an underpayment of R1 856 862.90. Investigators also obtained messages in which TYP employees circulated pending-lapse lists to advisers asking them to “fix” or “save” policies before “Friday”, as well as U$ave receipts reflecting multiple R50 payments made at the same pay-point at the same time.
Maake denied instructing advisers to make such payments or to pay less than the required premium to prevent policies from lapsing.
Bowmans concluded that the payments to Mulaudzi were “not supported by legitimate services or deliverables”, “appear intended to secure improper influence over internal processes and shield TYP from oversight and corrective action”, and “raise serious concerns regarding Maake’s integrity, as well as potential corruption”.
Not a disciplinary hearing or a trial
Maake challenged the debarment on several procedural grounds. Among other things, he argued that the process was unfair because no witnesses testified, no evidence was led under oath, and he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
He also contended that Sanlam should have appointed an investigator, an initiator, and an independent presiding chairperson, and the provider had become “the player and the referee at the same time”.
The Tribunal rejected each of the procedural complaints. Addressing what it regarded as the central issue, it held that Maake had “transposed the architecture of a disciplinary hearing, or of a trial” onto a statutory process that does not require such procedures.
It said neither the FAIS Act nor the Financial Sector Regulation Act requires a debarring provider to appoint an initiator, to lead oral evidence, to swear in witnesses, or to submit them to cross-examination.
Section 14(3) of the FAIS Act requires notice, disclosure of the debarment policy, and a reasonable opportunity to make “a submission” (Tribunal’s emphasis) – “a written process, not an adversarial one”.
Referring to FSCA Guidance Notice 1 of 2019, the Tribunal noted that the Act does not even require an oral hearing, although Sanlam had afforded Maake one in addition to inviting written submissions.
The Tribunal also rejected Maake’s complaint that he had been unable to call the authors of the Bowmans report or any other witnesses. It found that nothing in the record suggested he had asked to lead witnesses or requested the attendance of the report’s authors, or that any such request had been refused.
The sitting was his opportunity to answer the case, the Tribunal said, and it was not open to him to remain silent when that opportunity was available and then raise the complaint for the first time on reconsideration.
The Tribunal also rejected the “player and referee” complaint. It said section 14 deliberately confers a self-regulatory power on financial services providers in respect of their own representatives. The fact that the provider is the decision-maker is therefore part of the statutory design, not a defect. The relevant question was whether the power had been exercised without bias by a duly authorised person. In this case, the decision was taken by a debarment committee chaired by a person who had not been involved in the investigation and was based on a report prepared by independent external investigators.
Admissions decisive
Turning to the merits, the Tribunal referred to section 2 of the General Code of Conduct, which requires financial services to be rendered honestly, fairly, with due skill, care, and diligence, and in the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial services industry. It also referred to section 8 of the Determination of Fit and Proper Requirements, which requires a representative and key individual to be honest, have integrity, and be of good standing.
The Tribunal identified the basis of Sanlam’s decision as the payments to Mulaudzi and Maake’s own explanation of them.
The Tribunal said Sanlam’s conclusion did not depend primarily on inference, disputed witness evidence, or credibility findings. Instead, it rested principally on Maake’s own admissions. He had disclosed the payments himself, explained their purpose to Bowmans, supplied the proof of payment and banking records documenting the transactions, and acknowledged that no legitimate services or tangible benefits had been received in return.
On that material, the Tribunal said, “there was nothing left to prove”, adding that cross-examining the authors of the Bowmans report “could not have unsaid what the applicant himself said to them”.
Extortion explanation rejected
The Tribunal also rejected Maake’s contention that he had been the victim of extortion by Mulaudzi. It said the allegation was unsupported by evidence and contradicted Maake’s own account that the payments were made to secure Mulaudzi’s assistance in removing his business partner and to obtain ongoing protection for the franchise.
Even if the allegation were true, it said, it did not answer the charge that Maake had paid a Sanlam employee to obtain improper influence over the provider’s internal processes.
The Tribunal also regarded the timing as significant because Maake disclosed the payments only after Mulaudzi had left Sanlam and after his own franchise had become the subject of investigation.
Although the Tribunal recorded the objective Easypay evidence and noted that Maake had led no evidence to answer it, it said those allegations stood “on a different footing”. Because Sanlam’s ultimate finding, as recorded in the outcome letter, did not rest on the Easypay conduct, and because the admitted payments to Mulaudzi were sufficient, the Tribunal found it unnecessary to determine whether the Easypay allegations would independently have justified debarment.
The Tribunal said Maake’s substantive challenge ultimately amounted to a claim that there had been no evidence to justify the debarment. It rejected that argument, noting the evidence had been disclosed to him before the debarment, he had been invited to respond in writing but did not do so, and he had produced no facts or documents before the Tribunal to rebut the investigation report.
It added that even before the Tribunal Maake continued to justify making the payments, a stance that reinforced rather than diminished the concerns about his honesty and integrity.
Dismissing the application, the Tribunal reiterated that debarment under section 14 of the FAIS Act is not punitive but protective. Its purpose is to ensure that only persons who satisfy the fit and proper requirements continue to render financial services to the public.
“A principal who has paid more than R1.1m in bribes to insulate his franchise from the oversight of the provider he represents cannot be entrusted with the interests of clients or the integrity of the industry,” the Tribunal said.
