Consumers who first try to resolve disputes directly with suppliers before approaching regulators have received an important boost from the courts.
The High Court in Johannesburg has ruled that, in certain disputes involving defective goods or poor service, the three-year time limit for referring certain consumer complaints under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) starts running when a supplier refuses to provide a remedy required by the Act and not necessarily when the underlying service was performed.
The judgment, delivered on 15 May 2026, provides much-needed clarity on the interpretation of section 116(1) of the CPA and is likely to have broader implications for consumer-protection enforcement and the handling of complaints by the National Consumer Commission (NCC).
The central question before the Court was when the three-year contemplated in section 116(1) of the CPA begins.
The National Consumer Tribunal (NCT) had previously found that the period started when the supplier completed the installation of a replacement engine in the consumer’s vehicle in July 2020. On that interpretation, the NCC’s referral to the Tribunal in September 2023 was out of time.
The High Court found that the Tribunal had incorrectly identified the cause of complaint for purposes of section 116(1) of the CPA.
Acting Judge Owen Ben-Zeev found that where the CPA provides a specific remedy mechanism, a consumer’s complaint arises when the supplier fails or refuses to provide that remedy after being called upon to do so. In such circumstances, it is the refusal to remedy the problem – rather than the original defective service itself – that gives rise to the complaint contemplated by the Act.
“The complaint in terms of the Act was prompted by the refusal of the Supplier to remedy the matter,” the Court said. “This is what led the consumer to invoke the machinery of section 69 of the Act.”
Ben-Zeev AJ found that this interpretation better supports the objectives of the CPA because it encourages consumers to first seek redress from suppliers before invoking the Act’s formal dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Background to the dispute
The case arose from a dispute between Ndleneni Vollie Adoons and Car Care Clinic Wilrogate, trading as Car Care Clinic Service Centre.
In June 2020, Adoons took his Land Rover to the workshop after experiencing engine problems. The parties agreed that the vehicle’s engine would be replaced with a second-hand engine, and the vehicle was returned to him on 25 July 2020.
The vehicle subsequently experienced further problems, and on 24 September 2020, the engine caught fire while Adoons was driving. The vehicle was towed back to the workshop for assessment.
On 13 November 2020, Car Care Clinic provided Adoons with a report that allegedly cleared the workshop of any wrongdoing and attributed the fire to other causes. It refused to repair the damage or provide any remedy.
After attempts to resolve the matter through various dispute-resolution channels, including the Motor Industry Ombudsman of South Africa, proved unsuccessful, Adoons lodged a complaint with the NCC. The Commission subsequently investigated the matter and concluded that the supplier had contravened section 54 of the CPA.
The parties’ arguments
On appeal, the NCC and Adoons argued that the complaint arose only once the supplier refused to provide a remedy under section 54(2) of the CPA. According to the appellants, consumers cannot reasonably invoke the CPA’s enforcement mechanisms before first giving suppliers an opportunity to rectify defective goods or poor service.
Car Care Clinic argued that the complaint related to the installation of the replacement engine itself, and, therefore, the three-year period began running when the engine replacement was completed in July 2020.
Why the Court sided with the NCC
The Court found that Car Care Clinic’s interpretation failed to account for how the CPA is structured.
Ben-Zeev AJ noted that section 54 of the Act not only creates a right to quality service but also establishes an internal mechanism through which consumers can require suppliers to remedy defects. According to the Court, consumers should ordinarily follow that process before resorting to the formal complaint procedures contained in section 69 of the Act.
The judge drew a distinction between defective service and the refusal to remedy that defective service. Although poor workmanship may trigger a dispute, the complaint contemplated by the CPA arises only once the supplier declines to provide the remedy envisaged by the Act.
The Court did not accept the NCC’s alternative argument that the supplier’s refusal constituted a continuing practice that indefinitely suspended the statutory time limit. The judge found that such an interpretation could effectively render the time bar in section 116 meaningless.
As a result, the Court found that the cause of complaint arose on 13 November 2020, when the supplier formally rejected liability and refused to remedy the damage. The NCC’s referral of the matter to the Tribunal on 15 September 2023 therefore fell within the prescribed three-year period.
The High Court upheld the appeal, set aside the Tribunal’s ruling, and referred the matter back to the Tribunal for a hearing on the merits. No costs order was made.
The Court did, however, express concern about the pace of the NCC’s investigation, noting that the commission had referred the matter to the Tribunal at the “eleventh hour”. Ben-Zeev AJ urged the regulator to ensure that investigations are conducted with greater speed in future.
Welcoming the judgment, NCC Acting Commissioner Hardin Ratshisusu said: “The judgment strengthens consumer protection enforcement and provides much-needed clarity on the enforcement of consumer rights in line with the objectives of the CPA. The ruling further reinforces the responsibility of suppliers to properly address complaints relating to the supply of defective goods or poor service. The NCC will continue holding suppliers accountable for violating the CPA.”
Click here to download the judgment.
