A Sanlam financial adviser who challenged the termination of his contract after a complaint about his use of an Afrikaans phrase has failed in an urgent bid to preserve the contractual relationship pending trial, despite the Western Cape High Court accepting, for purposes of the interim application, that the disputed words probably referred to technical difficulties during the call rather than to the complainant.
However, in a decision handed down on 31 July 2026, the Court held that the case did not turn solely on the meaning of the phrase. Sanlam had also relied on two other incidents involving the adviser, and because those allegations had largely gone unanswered in the application, a trial court might still find that they justified the termination of his contract. In those circumstances, the adviser had not established a prima facie right to reinstatement – a prerequisite for the interim interdict he sought.
The judgment by Acting Judge Ashleigh Christians concerns an urgent application brought by Casper Jacobus Strydom, who had acted as an independent contractor and financial adviser for Sanlam Life Insurance Limited for 28 years.
He sought an order restoring and preserving his financial adviser contract pending an action in which he intends to seek a declaration that the termination of the contract was unlawful, invalid, and of no force and effect. The termination was due to take full effect on 31 July 2026.
Context of the disputed phrase
The dispute arose from a telephone conversation on 18 January 2026 between Strydom and Sanlam consultant Kelsey Visagie, a coloured woman, during which Strydom attempted to obtain information about one of his client’s investments.
According to Strydom, the conversation was hampered from the outset by poor audibility, repeated computer problems, and internet difficulties. While still speaking to Visagie, he asked a colleague in a neighbouring office whether he was able to access the relevant Sanlam platform. When the colleague replied that he was not experiencing the same problem, Strydom responded: “nou weer ’n bobbejaan op die lyn” – literally, “now there is a baboon on the line again”.
Visagie interpreted the remark as being directed at or about her and regarded it as racist. Sanlam agreed, finding that Strydom had breached its Workplace Harassment Policy and terminating his contract.
The Court said there could be no dispute that if the words had been directed at Visagie – or at any other person of colour – they would have been grossly racist and unacceptable, and Sanlam would have been entitled to terminate Strydom’s contract.
The question, however, was whether that was what had happened.
Strydom maintained he was using an Afrikaans expression referring to a poor telephone line or technical interruption, not to Visagie.
For purposes of the interim application, Christians AJ accepted that explanation.
In reaching that conclusion, the judge relied heavily on the expert evidence of Dr Karien van den Berg, a forensic linguist and senior lecturer at North-West University, who analysed the audio recording of the conversation. The judgment notes that her expertise had previously been accepted by the Equality Court in South African Human Rights Commission and Another v Malema and Another.
Van den Berg concluded that the linguistic evidence provided “substantially stronger support” for interpreting the disputed phrase as a figurative expression relating to technological difficulties than as a racially offensive reference to the consultant.
Her analysis pointed to the broader context of the conversation. Throughout the call, Strydom referred to poor audibility, a deteriorating telephone connection, his computer system freezing, and ongoing internet problems. Immediately before and after the disputed phrase, he continued complaining about the technical difficulties. Van den Berg also explained that Afrikaans contains many figurative uses of the word bobbejaan, and the meaning of any particular expression depends on its context rather than on the word in isolation.
Christians AJ observed that this contextual analysis was particularly important because, although bobbejaan has many colloquial uses in Afrikaans, it has also been used as a degrading racial slur against black South Africans. Van den Berg’s evidence demonstrated, however, that not every figurative use of the word carries racist connotations.
AI-generated explanation
The disputed remark had been investigated by Advocate Tanya Venter of Tokiso Dispute Settlement, who conducted an independent inquiry at Sanlam’s request.
During the investigation, Strydom sought to support his explanation by providing Venter with a Google AI-generated description of the phrase. It stated that “nou weer ’n bobbejaan op die lyn” refers to a disturbance or interruption during a telephone conversation and originated in the days of overhead telephone wires, when animals could interfere with telephone lines.
Venter rejected the explanation, noting it was not drawn from an official literary source, and concluded that the phrase had reasonably been understood as racial harassment. She recommended that Sanlam terminate Strydom’s contract under its Workplace Harassment Policy.
Although Christians AJ agreed that the AI-generated explanation was not an authoritative linguistic source, she observed it was nevertheless consistent with Strydom’s account and with the contextual evidence surrounding the telephone conversation.
Christians AJ disagreed with the Tokiso report’s rejection of Strydom’s explanation. On the evidence before her, the judge found that Sanlam had not cast serious doubt on his explanation of the words.
Objective test must start with context
Sanlam argued that Strydom’s subjective intention was ultimately irrelevant. It submitted that the appropriate legal test was whether the words used were reasonably capable of conveying a racist meaning to a reasonable person, and its Workplace Harassment Policy similarly requires an objective assessment of the reaction of a reasonable person in the context of the constitutional order.
The Court agreed with Sanlam only in part.
Christians AJ reviewed several Constitutional Court decisions dealing with racist language and accepted that South African law applies an objective test in determining whether words are racist or derogatory. But, she said, that enquiry rests on an anterior question: whether the words were directed at or about a particular person or group of people in the first place.
That, the judge said, was where Sanlam’s reasoning fell short.
The Constitutional Court decisions on which Sanlam relied all concerned words that were directed at identifiable people. By contrast, the evidence before the High Court did not support the conclusion that Strydom’s disputed phrase had been directed at Visagie at all. The Court therefore held that context remained central to the objective enquiry.
The judge nevertheless emphasised that this did not diminish Visagie’s reaction to what she heard.
Although she was not required to decide the point, Christians AJ said she accepted “without reservation” that Visagie believed the remark had been directed at her. From her perspective, the applicant was speaking to somebody else while she remained on the line, and her understanding would inevitably have been informed by South Africa’s history and by the continuing use of “baboon” as a racist and degrading term. The judge said she could not be faulted for interpreting the remark as being directed at her in the circumstances.
The Court added that the papers were silent on whether Strydom’s explanation had been conveyed to Visagie after the complaint. It observed that if she had been given the full context, she might have accepted the explanation and found relief in the fact that the remark had not been directed at her.
Applying the objective test in its proper context, Christians AJ concluded that Sanlam had not cast serious doubt on Strydom’s explanation of the disputed phrase. To the extent that Sanlam had terminated the contract on the basis that the January telephone conversation breached its Workplace Harassment Policy, the judge held that Strydom could, “at the very least”, obtain declaratory relief on that issue at a trial.
She emphasised, however, that this was not a final determination, and further evidence or cross-examination at trial could lead to a different conclusion.
Earlier allegations proved decisive
Christians AJ turned to what proved decisive: whether Sanlam could nevertheless justify terminating the contract on other grounds.
The issue was no longer whether Sanlam had correctly interpreted the January remark, but whether the contract could nevertheless be terminated on other grounds.
Sanlam relied on two other incidents.
The first arose from a complaint lodged in 2022 by four employees after an adviser session. According to the judgment, the complaint concerned Strydom’s comments that Afrikaans was the local language in Oudtshoorn, remarks to a coloured employee about her surname and “Van der Merwe” jokes, and his treatment of a black colleague. Although the complaint was resolved after Strydom apologised, Sanlam maintained that it remained relevant.
The second concerned a conversation in which Strydom allegedly remarked that service levels had deteriorated since Sanlam had “verkleur” – literally, “changed colour”. Sanlam understood the remark to mean that service levels had declined since it had appointed people of colour.
Christians AJ said neither incident assisted in determining the meaning of the disputed January statement. Their significance lay elsewhere.
Sanlam argued that even if it had been wrong to conclude that the January conversation breached its Workplace Harassment Policy, it was nevertheless entitled to justify terminating the contract on the basis of the earlier incidents. It relied on the established principle that a party may defend the cancellation of a contract on any valid legal ground that existed at the time, even if that was not the reason originally relied upon.
The Court accepted that submission as legally sound, relying on established principles of contract law.
The judge then examined how Strydom had dealt with those allegations.
Sanlam’s letter of 15 April 2026, headed “Contemplation of contract termination”, expressly referred not only to the Visagie complaint but also to the 2022 complaint and the “verkleur” conversation. Yet Strydom’s founding affidavit treated the letter as though it concerned only the January telephone conversation. He neither attached the letter nor addressed the additional allegations.
Christians AJ found that this had been a conscious choice.
Rejecting Strydom’s contention that Sanlam had introduced the historical allegations for the first time in its answering affidavit, the judge held that they had been raised before Sanlam decided to terminate the contract and that Strydom had elected not to answer them.
The judge described Strydom’s attempt to isolate the Visagie incident as “an opportunistic attempt” to exploit what the Court regarded as flaws in the Tokiso report and Sanlam’s reasoning. But, the judge added, “in doing so, the applicant has consciously (and to his peril) left Sanlam’s other concerns unanswered”.
Although the Court made no final findings on either of the earlier incidents, it held that a trial court might regard them as providing a valid justification for terminating the contract. Christians AJ observed that the 2022 complaint, although resolved amicably, might nevertheless shed light on Strydom’s character, while the “verkleur” conversation was, on the unanswered version before the Court, “at face value, racist in nature”.
The judge held that even if Strydom ultimately succeeded in showing that the January incident did not justify Sanlam’s decision – “which is likely” – a trial court might nevertheless uphold the termination on the strength of the earlier allegations. Strydom had therefore failed to establish, even on a prima facie basis, that reinstatement would necessarily follow.
That conclusion proved fatal to Strydom’s application for interim relief.
Interim relief refused
The Court was also unpersuaded that Strydom would suffer irreparable harm if interim relief were refused. It held that the loss of goodwill and future income from his client base was capable of being quantified in a claim for damages. Nor was there evidence that clients would suffer prejudice if their portfolios were allocated to another adviser while the litigation continued.
On the balance of convenience, the judge accepted that Sanlam could not reasonably be expected to continue presenting Strydom to clients as one of its accredited advisers while concerns about his conduct remained unresolved. Although those concerns might not ultimately be justified in relation to the January incident, they nevertheless remained relevant because of the unresolved 2022 complaint and the “verkleur” conversation.
Finding that Strydom had an adequate alternative remedy in the form of a damages claim, Christians AJ dismissed the application with costs, leaving the lawfulness of Sanlam’s termination to be determined in the main action.
Click here to download the judgment.
