Close to 85% of positions in the Road Accident Fund’s legal division are vacant, highlighting the scale of the Fund’s operational and governance failures.
This is the latest in a string of revelations uncovered by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts’ inquiry into the RAF’s financial affairs, which began late last year.
Appearing before SCOPA on 3 February, RAF interim board member Kenneth Brown said the board had been appointed with a clear mandate from Transport Minister Barbara Creecy, including the need to address escalating legal risks.
In testimony before SCOPA in October, former RAF chief financial officer Victor Songelwa said management had ignored internal warnings following the controversial 2020 decision to dissolve the Fund’s panel of attorneys. The panel – a network of more than 100 private law firms handling the RAF’s court cases – had been accused of inflating costs and slowing settlements.
Read: RAF management dismissed warnings as ‘negativity’ while claims crisis deepened
The Office of the State Attorney, which was meant to take over, had fewer than 20 lawyers nationwide, compared with roughly 500 in the private panel. Thousands of cases went unattended, and judges began issuing default judgments worth millions.
The fallout was reflected in claims handling. The RAF’s 2023/24 annual report shows registered claims fell from 303 695 in 2019/20 to 79 377 in 2024, while personal claims dropped from 102 086 to 18 286. Weekly registrations fell from 1 963 to 351, and claims finalised dropped from 80 370 to 26 808 over the same period.
Costs, meanwhile, continued to rise. According to RAF’s annual reports, total payouts were R44 billion in 2020, R35.5bn in 2021, R43.4bn in 2022, R46.4bn in 2023, and R45.6bn in 2024. The average value per claim surged 70% in a single year, from R138 000 in 2020 to R235 000 in 2021.
Staff suspensions compounded the crisis. According to testimony before SCOPA, more than 200 claims officers were suspended during 2021 and 2022, with most not replaced, leaving remaining officers to handle an average of 2 000 files each.
On Tuesday, Brown told SCOPA that vacancies in critical areas were particularly acute within the legal division. He said the vacancy rate was close to 85% (more than 385 positions vacant), leaving only a fraction of approved legal posts filled.
The absence of a permanent head of legal, combined with severe understaffing, hollowed out the RAF’s ability to defend matters, settle claims, or provide proper legal oversight. Brown said this capacity collapse directly contributed to the surge in default judgments against the Fund.
Human resources failures
Brown told SCOPA that the interim board’s direct engagement with staff disclosed deep human capital dysfunction that had not been fully disclosed to the board initially. He said that without visiting staff, the board would not have known the true state of affairs, because information from executives was “not forthcoming”.
Brown explained that the RAF was operating with two parallel organisational structures, and hundreds of employees were effectively outside any formal framework. He said that staff described their situation as “floating… we are in a swimming pool. We have nowhere in the structure.”
According to Brown, about 300 employees were not properly placed within the approved structure, while more than 400 contract staff were performing core functions.
The board resolved to merge the two organisational structures, lift the moratorium on restructuring, and require management to implement a transition plan.
The interim board also uncovered problems with suspensions and dismissals, which Brown described as a “moving target”. Numbers reported at different meetings varied, and clarity was achieved only after the board pushed management to provide accurate information.
Among the most damaging legacies inherited by the interim board, Brown said, were prolonged paid suspensions. Staff members had been suspended for three to four years without finalised disciplinary outcomes, costing the RAF about R50m in salaries, while external legal fees climbed to roughly R120m. Several cases were ultimately lost.
Highlighting the organisational impact, Brown said the board found a “climate of fear within the organisation. People were afraid to actually just engage. It was tough for them at the end of the day.”
To address this, the board has invited affected staff to come forward, established objective processes to review suspensions and dismissals, and begun developing reintegration and wellness programmes. On the latter, he said the board is working “on an extensive wellness programme to deal with the staff who were dismissed, even the ones who were suspended”.
Brown also emphasised the need for reintegration support for staff returning after extended absences, noting that although the RAF had led the board to believe a reintegration programme existed, “it didn’t exist, and we… are now working basically on that reintegration programme”.
Prolonged use of acting appointments
SCOPA chairperson Songezo Zibi expressed deep concern about the widespread and prolonged use of acting appointments in prescribed officer roles. He said the historical lack of board oversight over acting appointments was alarming, particularly given the complexity and risk profile of the RAF.
He cited the appointment of a former senior manager as acting CFO as an example of what he described as “criminally negligent” decision-making. He told the committee that professional designation alone did not equate to suitability for the role, particularly in an entity grappling with complex public-sector accounting, massive contingent liabilities, and an ongoing solvency crisis.
According to Zibi, the acting CFO demonstrated a poor grasp of the public-sector accounting framework and made a decisive intervention that directly triggered the RAF’s litigation against the Auditor-General over the use of IPSAS 42. That decision, he said, not only failed to resolve the underlying accounting dispute but also set off a chain of events that cost the RAF more than R11.2m in legal fees, entrenched multiple adverse audit opinions, and left the Fund without credible financial statements.
Brown acknowledged that although management requires limited flexibility to make short-term acting appointments, the real governance failure lay in allowing those arrangements to persist for years without effective board oversight. On permanent appointments, he emphasised, accountability rests squarely with the board.
Filling of key executive roles
The RAF has also come under fire for leaving key executive roles unfilled for extended periods. SCOPA has repeatedly flagged that critical posts – including head of legal services and chief claims officer – had remained vacant for more than two years, undermining the Fund’s core functions even as default judgments mounted.
Interim board member Richard Dyantyi told SCOPA that the interim board moved swiftly to address leadership instability after its appointment in August. He said recruitment for permanent executive roles began almost immediately, including the chief executive officer, head of legal, chief operations officer, and senior claims positions.
Dyantyi said the board completed the CEO recruitment process in under a month and submitted its recommendation to the Minister of Transport by the end of November; the appointment is now at the minister’s approval stage.
The RAF has seen rapid turnover at the top over the past year. On 1 December 2025, chief internal audit officer Radikwena Phora was appointed acting chief executive, replacing Songelwa, who resigned just weeks into the role. Phora’s appointment marked the fourth change in the CEO position in seven months.
Songelwa had been appointed unanimously by the interim board at a meeting on 3 November 2025, following the suspension of acting CEO Phathutshedzo Lukhwareni on 7 November, shortly after the new board assumed office. Lukhwareni had been acting CEO since May 2025, after the suspension of Collins Letsoalo.
RAF 1 form and looming legal exposure
The RAF introduced a new RAF 1 form in 2021, intended to simplify and standardise the claims process by consolidating several existing documents into one. In practice, however, it caused delays because many claimants and legal representatives were unfamiliar with the format, and the Fund lacked clear internal systems for processing it.
At the same time, the direct claims department, which had previously allowed members of the public to submit claims without legal representation, was discontinued.
The RAF 1 form became yet another administrative bottleneck that slowed registrations and finalisations even further.
Brown confirmed that the RAF 1 claim form was under review. He acknowledged that it is overly complex and places an unreasonable burden on claimants, including the requirement for paid medical reports upfront.
Of more than 105 000 claims submitted, 72% were deemed non-compliant, effectively forcing claimants back into an attorney-driven system. With the form currently before the Supreme Court of Appeal, Brown conceded that an adverse ruling could expose the RAF to additional liabilities of up to R100bn.
